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Ritchey: A Critical Analysis

1.0 Introduction

There have been many attempts from feminist philosophers and scholars to define
the gender categories and, particularly, the concept woman. However, all of the
theories attempting to define woman seem to suffer from the inclusion problem,
which is a theory’s failure to account for all women in their definition of woman.
Katherine Jenkins, however, has argued that her theory avoids the inclusion
problem. She does this by dividing her article into three parts: (1) an assessment
of Sally Haslanger’s argument, (2) a proposal of two senses of gender, and (3) a
construction and explanation of her inclusive ameliorative account. I will start by
summarizing these three parts then I will argue that her theory fails at avoiding
the inclusion problem because her definition of woman is circular.
2.0 Summary of the Three Parts
2.1 Assessment of Haslanger’s Argument

To begin, I will split Jenkins’ assessment of Haslanger’s argument into three
parts: explanation, objection, and salvaging. First, Jenkins explains how
Haslanger uses a method of conceptual analysis called the ameliorative inquiry
and then creates the notion of a target concept. A target concept is the concept of
F-ness that “a particular group should aim to get people to use, given a particular
set of goals that the group holds.”1 An ameliorative inquiry is the project of
arriving at that target concept. So, an ameliorative inquiry is not epistemic, it is
moral. It concerns which target concept we should use. In Haslanger’s
ameliorative inquiry into the concept woman, she concludes that we should use
the target concept “someone who is socially subordinated in some way on the
basis of presumed female sex.”2 She claims that this target concept protects her
theory from the inclusion problem because “although not all prima facie women
are included, all prima facie women who are subject to oppression are included.”3
However, Jenkins objects saying that Haslanger’s target concept does not
account for some trans women and that if this target concept of woman were
adopted, then it would aggravate the existing marginalization of trans women
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within feminist discourse.4 For example, Haslanger’s target concept could not
account for a trans woman who “does not publicly present as a woman and is
perceived as a man by people around her.”5 Additionally, it would not account for
a trans woman who does publicly present as a woman, but whose gender
presentation is not respected by those around her.6 Jenkins then speculates
whether or not Haslanger fully realized the troubling consequences of such an
unacceptable exclusion. This exclusion is absolutely unacceptable because it
violates the goal(s) of feminism (e.g., to end the oppression against women):
“Trans people in general are a severely disadvantaged and marginalized group in
society, suffering oppression and injustice in multiple respects including
discriminatory denial of goods such as employment, medical care, and housing;
consistently negative portrayals in the media; and particularly high risks of
violence… Failure to respect the gender identifications of trans people is a serious
harm and is conceptually linked to forms of transphobic oppression and even
violence.7”8 So, this led Jenkins to think that Haslanger hadn’t realized this
consequence. If she had, then it does not seem that she would have promoted it as
the explanation of the “central and core phenomena” of the concept woman meant
to benefit feminist scholarship. Thus, Haslanger’s theory fails to avoid the
inclusion problem because it fails to account for the gender identifications of trans
women.
Third, Jenkins attempts to salvage Haslanger’s method of ameliorative
inquiry. She does this because she believes that it “is in fact well placed to
respond to the inclusion problem as it manifests in regard to trans women,
provided due attention is paid to having an inclusive understanding of the identity
of the agents of inquiry.”9 In other words, she does this because it has the
potential to avoid the inclusion problem. This potential, however, is unlocked
only when the identities of the agents of inquiry are respected. And the identities
of the agents of inquiry are respected only when the target concept(s) account for
them. Haslanger’s target concept does not account for the identities of trans
4
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women and, thus, it alone is not sufficient for avoiding the inclusion problem. So,
in order for the inquiry to avoid the inclusion problem, either a replacement target
concept needs to be discovered that accounts for all the identities of the agents of
inquiry, or more target concepts need to be discovered that account for the
identities of trans women. This is where Jenkins begins her conceptual
exploration.
2.2 Proposal of Two Senses of Gender

Jenkins begins her exploration by first addressing Haslanger’s target concept. She
does this because, although it excluded trans women, it still seemed to grasp an
important aspect of the phenomenon of gender – an aspect that Jenkins later calls
gender as class. This redeeming kernel is crucial because it is the reason that
Jenkins does not seek a replacement target concept and, instead, turns to look for
another target concept that respects the identities of trans women.10 The first step
in doing this, however, is to locate an aspect of the phenomenon of gender that
accounts for the identities of trans women.11 Such an aspect would satisfy
feminism’s goal of being trans-inclusive and would serve as a foundation for a
new target concept. In taking this first step, Jenkins relies on the following insight
from Haslanger: genders are subject positions that emerge from a “social matrix
of practices, norms, institutions, material structures, rationales, and so forth.”12
Additionally, this social matrix is heavily shaped by whatever ideology is
dominant within it and, as a result, the phenomenon of gender is heavily shaped
by this dominant ideology. However, the phenomenon of gender is not
determined entirely by the proponents of the dominant ideology. This is because
their understanding of the phenomenon can be disputed, resisted, or temporarily
elided in various ways by the proponents of non-dominant ideologies.13 From this
insight, Jenkins deduces that gender can be understood at a local level because
10

Although, Jenkins does not deny that there could be one target concept that respects all the
identities of the agents of inquiry. She keeps Haslanger’s, which she called gender as class,
because of the redeeming kernel, viz. the important aspect that the target concept grasps (more on
this later).
11
Remember that an ameliorative inquiry is about discovering the concept of F-ness that “a
particular group should aim to get people to use, given a particular set of goals that the group
holds.” The particular group in both Haslanger and Jenkins’ case, includes all feminists or at least
attempts to include all feminists.
12
Ibid, 407.
13
Ibid, 407.

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021

3

Global Tides, Vol. 15 [2021], Art. 6

subject positions are a product of multiple ideologies within a social matrix – not
just the dominant ideology. If this is the case, then there is a gap that distinguishes
between gender as it’s understood by the dominant ideology and gender as it’s
understood by non-dominant ideologies. Jenkins argues that the former
understanding constitutes gender as class and is grasped by Haslanger’s target
concept while the latter constitutes a trans-inclusive aspect that remains to be
grasped by a target concept. She then labels this other aspect gender as identity
and begins to define it along with gender as class:
S is classed as a woman within a context C iff S is marked in C as a target
for subordination on the basis of actual or imagined bodily features
presumed to be evidence of a female’s role in biological reproduction.
(corresponds to Haslanger’s target concept)
-ANDS has a female gender identity iff S’s internal ‘map’ is formed to guide
someone classed as a woman through the social or material realities that
are, in that context, characteristic of women as a class.14
Before I move on, there are some things that need clarification. First, Jenkins
notes in a footnote here that having a female gender identity is different from
identifying as a woman because the former does not imply that identifying as a
woman is necessarily a conscious process.15 One can certainly have a female
gender identity without identifying as a woman. For example, a recently
transitioned trans woman could say that “she had always had a female gender
identity but that she only recently begun to identify as a woman.”16 Second, S’s
internal map is a metaphor for the nature of gender identity. It is supposed to
explain not only how gender identity is something lived out and explored but also
something embodied and objective. If gender identity is like a map, then the
boundaries of that identity do not change, but our knowledge of our gender
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identity does – it changes the more we explore.17 So, if one’s internal map brings
them into contact with the social or material realities or boundaries that
characterize the life of someone classed as a woman, then they have a female
gender identity. This is different from being classed as a woman because the
dominant ideology does not determine whether or not someone has a female
gender identity. So, being classed as a woman and having a female gender
identity, Jenkins claims, are both required for a successful ameliorative inquiry
into the concept woman, “such that they should be considered ‘twin’ target
concepts.”18
2.3 Construction & Explanation of Jenkins’ Inclusive Ameliorative Account

In the previous sections, I explained how Jenkins concludes that the target
concepts being classed as a woman and having a female gender identity are both
required for a successful ameliorative inquiry. In this section, Jenkins considers
how these target concepts match with linguistic terms. In other words, she turns to
the question: How do these two twin target concepts match the term “woman”?
Jenkins argues that, in today’s context, the term “woman” should be allocated to
gender as identity, given the fact that “society at large displays great amounts of
transphobia and cissexism.”19 She argues for this conclusion for three reasons: if
the term “woman” was allocated to gender as class instead, then (1) the existing
marginalization of trans women within feminism would be reinforced, (2) cis
women would gain more power in the political sphere, and (3) it would invite all
women to abandon their identity as a woman since it articulates “a negative ideal
that challenges male dominance.”20 This invitation, Jenkins argues, would be
received differently by cis women who are pushed towards this negative ideal
than trans women who struggle to claim it. Thus, the invitation would cause a
division: the trans women will not be willing to abandon their identity as a woman
because they struggle to claim it whereas cis or prima facie women do not. Each
of these three reasons together makes allocating the term “woman” to gender as
class counterproductive for feminism’s goals. So, “woman” should instead be
17
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allocated to gender as identity. At first, this allocation of terms seems to move
away from Jenkins’ conclusion that both target concepts are required for a
successful ameliorative inquiry. However, she says that the considerations that
motivated the allocation of terms are entirely contingent. In fact, one would be
justified in allocating the term “woman” to gender as class only if, and in that
case because, the dominant ideology or “society at large” began to respect the
gender identifications of the agents of inquiry. Therefore, both target concepts are
still required for a successful ameliorative inquiry and the term “women” should
be allocated to gender as identity (i.e., should be used to refer to people who have
a female gender identity), given today’s context.
3.0 Objections, Responses, and Replies to Responses
3.1 Why Not Jettison Gender as Class?

As I read Jenkins’ article, three objections came to mind. The first one originated
with the question: If gender as identity accounts for all who have an identity, then
why do we need gender as class? It seems fine to jettison gender as class since
what it accounts for – viz., oppressed prima facie women – is already accounted
for by gender as identity. I suppose that Jenkins would respond by saying that
gender as identity is a response to the injustice that gender as class highlights: the
marginalization and oppression of women caused by the unjust structures and
definitions of the dominant ideology. The target concept classed as a woman
grasps an important aspect of the phenomena of gender and, thus, it can not be
jettisoned even if gender as identity accounts for everything that gender as class
does. This seems to make sense because so long as there is a dominant and a nondominant ideology present within the same context and so long as each of their
concepts of F-ness differs, then there will always be two target concepts. It won’t
be until the dominant ideology respects the gender identities of the agents of
inquiry that gender as class will be sufficient for meeting the feminist goal of
ending the oppression of women.
3.2 Vagueness

A second objection concerns vagueness: If there are multiple target concepts for
the concept woman and if the one that people should use changes frequently, then
this would lead to issues of vagueness on a grand scale. Everyone within context
C would be morally obligated to use the one target concept of woman. But what if
that target concept changes due to a rapidly changing social matrix, such that a
new target concept should be used every few decades? Or years? Or months?
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Everyone would be completely confused. I think Jenkins would reply by saying
that the social matrix is not something that changes as rapidly as I might imagine.
Dominant ideologies, and ideologies in general, are not so easily abandoned by
those who hold them. Their influence is rooted deep into the social matrix and
permeates the structures of the matrix. So, issues of vagueness will only arise
during the times that these ideologies change, which are few and far between so to
speak. In other words, there will be vagueness within the process of change, but
the difference between the understandings of the concept woman before and after
the process of change will be distinct. One will be just and the other will not. So,
the issue of vagueness is present within the change, but it is not vicious because:
(1) the changes are few and far between and (2) because our moral obligation to
adopt the just understanding of the concept woman is clear throughout the process
of change. This seems convincing to me; so, I would be willing to agree.
3.3 Circularity & Internal Map

Lastly, I had two dual concerns for Jenkins’ target concept having a female
gender identity. My first concern was that it was circular. It seems that S has a
female gender identity if and only if S has an internal map of this sort – the
female gender identity sort. If this is the case, then Jenkins’ target concept needs
to be reworked or jettisoned. The second concern I had for Jenkins’ target concept
having a female gender identity related to having an internal map. But what does
this mean? And how can one’s internal map guide someone else who is classed as
a woman? Regarding this first question, I suppose Jenkins would respond by
saying that having an internal map means having an identity, such that one’s
identity has boundaries and is meant to be explored just like a map. Regarding the
second question, I think Jenkins could respond by saying that the phrase
“someone classed as a woman” is not included to represent someone else but
rather is included to capture the close relationship between being classed as a
woman and having a female gender identity. Then she could offer an explanation
of this close relationship in order to respond to my first concern of circularity: The
two target concepts are distinct; however, they are in a close relationship because
the latter relies on the former. In other words, one’s having a female gender
identity depends on one’s contact with the norms that characterize the life of a
someone classed as a woman. “What is important is that one takes those norms to
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be relevant to oneself.”21 Thus, she would conclude, S’s having a female gender
identity is not simply determined by S having an internal map “of this sort.” I
would reply saying that one’s taking the norms to be relevant to oneself is the
same or sufficiently similar to self-identifying as a woman. If this is the case and
the term “woman” is allocated to those who have a female gender identity, then S
is a woman if and only if S self-identifies as a woman. So, the biconditional is
circular because “woman” is now in the definition of “woman.” This circularity
issue seems to undermine Jenkins’ whole project since there is now no target
concept that accounts for trans women. Thus, trans women are still excluded and
the inclusion problem has reappeared.
4.0 Conclusion

In this essay, I analyzed Katherine Jenkins’ ameliorative inquiry into the concept
woman. I did this by first explaining how she assessed Sally Haslanger’s
argument and concluded that an additional target concept was needed in order to
account for the identities of trans women. Then I explained her exploration of the
phenomena of gender and how she discovered a second aspect within the
phenomena that respected the gender identities of trans women. Lastly, I
described Jenkins’ two conclusions: First, that the target concepts being classed
as a woman and having a female gender identity are equally crucial because of
their close relationship. Second, that the term “woman” should be used to refer to
people who have a female gender identity instead of people who are classed as a
woman. After I explained Jenkins’ two conclusions, I offered objections and
discovered that Jenkins’ definition of woman is circular. Thus, it cannot be used
to account for trans women. Therefore, Jenkins’ theory fails at avoiding the
inclusion problem because her definition of woman is circular.
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